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Abstract
This paper reviews the evidence on the effectiveness of individual merit pay systems for
teachers on student achievement, and it presents new empirical results based on a system
established within a collective bargaining environment.  While many merit pay systems have been
established in school districts across the U.S., very little empirical evidence concerning their
influence on student achievement exists.  A natural experiment arose in a county in which one
high school piloted a merit pay system that rewarded student retention and student evaluations of
teachers while another comparable high school maintained a traditional compensation system.  A
difference-in-differences analysis implies that merit pay had no effect on grade point averages,
reduced the percentage of students who dropped out of courses, reduced average daily
attendance, and increased the percentage of students who failed.
The outcomes illustrate the difficulty of instituting individual merit pay in schools.  The
goal  was to increase student retention.  A student was considered to be retained in a class if the
student was present during a randomly selected day of the last week of classes.  The system
“worked” by this measure because the school experienced a significant reduction in course
noncompleters.  However it is not clear that this measure was correlated with student
achievement or even average attendance, and indeed, neither of these outcomes were improved.  
1For example, Ballou and Podgursky (1997), pp. 107-08, present this argument.
2See Eberts and Stone (1984, 1986, 1987, 1991) and Stone (1998) for empirical evidence that counters this
sentiment.  These studies find evidence that collective bargaining agreements are correlated with student achievement.
I. Introduction
Public discontent with the performance of U.S. public elementary and secondary schooling
in raising student achievement is deep.  International comparisons of test scores place the United
States in the lowest echelons, and comparative analyses of student achievement among regions
and demographic groups point out sizeable gaps.  Urban schools appear to be the worst
performers.  In response, reformers have advocated incentive-based or market-driven educational
reforms to improve school quality, such as merit pay for teachers.   Merit pay plans have been
implemented in many places and the concept has been around for many years, yet there is
surprisingly little evidence of their effectiveness in raising student achievement.
Why haven’t incentive-based reforms such as merit pay produced better results?  Some
would say that the implementation has not gone far enough.  Merit pay increases have not been
large enough to compensate teachers for the risk involved or to induce them to excel in the
classroom.  Teacher unions, which represent about two-thirds of the nation’s elementary and
secondary teachers, may also thwart the success of market-based reforms.1  There is st ong
sentiment, particularly among those advocating market-based  reforms, that the goals of teacher
unions, as manifested in collective bargaining agreements, are not aligned with the goal of
improving student performance.2
A third explanation may lie in the inherent nature of the educational process.  Education
involves multiple stakeholders, disparate and conflicting goals, complex and multitask jobs, team
production, uncertain inputs, and idiosyncratic elements contingent on the attributes of individual
students, the efforts and attitudes of fellow teachers, and the classroom environments.  The
3See Murnane and Cohen (1986).
4Others have cited problems with successfully implementing a merit pay system even in private business.  A
study in the early 1980s on the topic found that the practices of merit pay in private industry are neither as common
nor effective as many believe (Lawler, 1983).
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complexity of the process may tend to mitigate the student achievement effects of reforms based
on individual incentive pay.3  
A sizeable literature on incentives demonstrates that education does not differ from the
private sector all that much in the incidence of performance-based compensation.  Only a small
proportion of jobs in the private sector base compensation on explicit contracts that reward
individual performance.  Rather, private sector companies prefer to reward individuals based on
discretionary subjective measures of performance or to follow bureaucratic rules that establish job
grades and promotion criteria.4  Furthermore, private sector businesses reward workers more
through promotions and group-based merit systems than through individual merit rewards
(Prendergast 1999).
The purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to review the scant evidence on the effectiveness
of individual merit pay on student achievement and 2) to present new empirical evidence on the
subject.  Merit pay reforms attempt to incorporate individual pay-for-performance systems into
school compensation systems.  Many of these systems have been introduced in nonunion schools;
a few have been successful in gaining union approval.  Our review finds very little empirical
evidence concerning the influence of merit pay on student achievement.  To begin to fill this gap
in our knowledge about merit pay, we have acquired student achievement data from a high school
that is operating a merit pay system within a unionized district and a high school that uses a more
traditional compensation system that we argue has a comparable student population.   We
describe the structure and operation of the merit pay plan and use a difference-in-differences
5Much of the argument presented here was also presented in Murnane and Cohen (1986).
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approach to examine its effects on student outcomes.   While the sample size is small, we submit
that the juxtaposition of a merit-pay system and a traditional compensation system within similar
high schools drawing from the same population offers a rare opportunity to evaluate the effects of
such a system.
II. Performance-based Compensation Systems for Individual Agents
The nature of the educational process complicates and confounds the effectiveness of
individual performance-based compensation systems.5  The si ple, static principal--agent model
that Prendergast (1999) explicates rewards agents for taking on additional risk through a pay-for-
performance contract with higher (mean) wages.  In his model, the performance measures used
are noisy and the efficacy of the incentives depends on the risk aversion of the agents.  As is well
known, incentives may result in unintended, sometimes perverse, consequences.  Prendergast uses
the term “dysfunctional behavioral responses;” Murnane and Cohen (1986) call it “opportunistic
behavior.”
Institutional factors that may result in such dysfunctional responses include poorly defined
or poorly measured outcomes leading to a reliance on subjective evaluations that may be flawed;
multitasking by job incumbents; team production; and multiple principals/stakeholders.  An
obvious condition that must hold for pay-for-performance schemes is that performance is
measured and that both the agent and principal understand the measure, but measurement may be
costly or difficult.  Occupations where “output” has an important quality dimension that is
subjectively measured (e.g., design, or arts and entertainment) or whose output is a dimension of
6In their case studies, Murnane and Cohen (1986) found that school principals reported causing morale
problems by subjectively rating very good teachers as “Excellent,” when there was a higher level category of
“Outstanding.”  These problems would be avoided by giving fewer or many more “Outstanding” ratings.
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quality of life (e.g., most medical or related occupations) are most likely to rely on subjective
evaluations of performance.  
Subjective evaluations may be flawed because a) evaluators may be subject to a moral
hazard problem if they are being compensated based on their performance and they can claim part
of the evaluatee’s performance as their own (theft); b) individuals being evaluated may engage in
nonproductive activities to curry favor with their evaluators; or c) evaluators may end up with
distributions of ratings that are compressed because of a reluctance to give very high or very low
ratings6 (Prendergast 1999, pp. 29-31).   Jobs in which the incumbents perform many different
tasks also strain an incentives-based compensation contract.  First, multiple tasks imply multiple
performance measures, some of which may have measurability problems.  Second, if performance
measures are skewed in how they relatively weight various tasks, then the agent may respond by
investing too much effort into the tasks that receive the most weight in the performance
measurement system.  
Team production introduces the “1/n” problem, in which each individual’s contribution
(and reward) is diluted by the size of the team.  Furthermore, if the individuals’ contributions to
the team are costly to observe or measure, then team-based incentives may lead to free riders. 
The problems for an incentive-based compensation system when there are multiple stakeholders
come from a potential for misalignment of organizational goals.  In effect, the principal--agent
arrangement becomes a “principals”-agent problem, and multiple principals may have different,
and conflicting, goals that they want followed.  For example, training directors and production
5supervisors may conflict with each on how to reward an individual’s (paid) time spent in training
activities.
Each of these four constraints on the effectiveness of incentives-based
compensation—need for reliance on subjectively measured outcomes, multiple tasks undertaken
by incumbent workers, team production, and multiple stakeholders—characterize the teaching and
learning process in schools.  Learning outcomes can be and are assessed through standardized
tests, which are amenable to performance-based contracts (particularly if value-added measures
are available).  However, there are many additional dimensions to student learning and
development that are either not assessed or are assessed but not with standardized instruments, so
that ultimately evaluations are inherently subjective.
Schools (at all levels of the K-12 system) typically have literally dozens of learning
processes or programs going on simultaneously.  These might include core academic subjects;
noncore academic subjects such as art, physical education, music; acquisition of technology skills;
career development; special education; extracurricular offerings; gifted and talented programs;
human growth and development; and remediation or developmental education.  At some levels of
education (e.g., elementary grade levels), teachers may individually be involved in virtually all of
these programs.  Even at secondary school levels, which are typically organized by academic
discipline, teachers get involved in areas such as career development, extracurricular leadership,
and special education (as mainstreaming becomes the status quo).  But the myriad of programs or
processes that occur in schools is only one source of multitasks.  Even within a teacher’s
discipline, multiple tasks comprise the teaching and learning process: curriculum development and
7We do note that collective bargaining seems to impose added costs (inefficiency) to a district.  Perhaps these
costs could be identified, captured, and re-allocated as merit pay.  Also market-based alternatives to traditional public
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planning, instruction, and assessment, for example.  Furthermore, good teaching requires attention
to students’ learning styles, which may mean multiple modes of instruction.
Education, to some extent, requires team production.  For example, many elementary and
middle schools are organized into teams of teachers.  The notion at the elementary level is to rely
on teachers’ comparative advantages in core academic areas so that each teacher in a team is
responsible for the subjects with which they are most comfortable.  However, even apart from
explicit team teaching, departmentalized secondary schools result in team production because
students’ performances on standardized tests depend on learning in several courses taught by
different teachers.
Finally, school governance and control is characterized by many different stakeholders
with differing, and sometimes conflicting, goals.  Administrators who are accountable for direct
student achievement may be most responsive to levels of test scores.  School board members who
are accountable for resource decisions may be most interested in changes (value added) over time
in test scores.  Parents may be most concerned about postsecondary education attendance rates,
whereas employers may be most concerned about “soft” employability skills such as
problemsolving, attendance, and attitude.  
Another characteristic of most school districts is that they have very little control over
their revenue streams.  As noted, incentive-based contracts allocate part of the production risk to
the employees in return for higher rewards (wages).  But since school administrators have little
revenue to share, they cannot offer sizeable increases in compensation were teachers willing to
accept the risk inherent in a merit-pay system.7  Furthermore, increased teacher performance does
schools may be less reliant on state or local government funding, and therefore may be in more control of their revenue.
8Murnane and Cohen (1986) also emphasized the short-lived, ineffective nature of merit pay systems.
7
little to add to the revenue of a school district (as meeting or exceeding sales quotas would do for
a private company), except perhaps for attracting more students into a district.
In short, while empirical evidence and common sense show clearly that economic actors
respond to incentives, we argue that there are several wedges between performance measures and
the actions of teachers that tend to militate against individual level, incentive-based compensation
schemes.  In developing this paper, we found little empirical evidence on the effects of merit pay
on student achievement.  Most of the literature on merit pay systems documents the institutional
experiences in districts.  Those experiences, for the most part, have been rather short-lived and
usually negative.  For example, a major study of merit-based pay (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford
1994) found that most (75%) merit-pay programs that had been in existence in 1983 and had been
studied by the researchers were no longer operational in 1993.8  An i teresting self-described
limitation of the study is that they did not examine student achievement.  They noted,
We would especially have liked to have performed an in-depth analysis of the
impact of incentive programs on student achievement.  However, very few of the
participating districts had attempted any systematic evaluation of the effects of
their incentive plans on student achievement, even though a basic assumption
behind incentive plans is that teachers can indeed significantly affect learning.  (pp.
7-8).
In a study involving one district in Pennsylvania, Tulli (1991) found no correlation
between gains in student achievement and teachers awarded merit bonuses under this district’s
plan.  The author noted, however, that this district heavily weighted inputs such as attendance,
participation in professional development, and supervision of extra activities relative to student
outcomes.
8III. A Case Study of a Merit Pay System within a Collective Bargaining Environment
To add to the empirical literature on merit pay systems, we have acquired data from a high
school that implemented a merit pay system in 1996 and a comparable high school that maintained
a traditional compensation system.  What is interesting about the school that adopted merit pay is
that it is the only school in its local public school system that is nonunionized.  The Michigan
district where this high school is located has an enrollment of about 9,000 students and has 15
school buildings, three of which are high schools.  The high school that implemented the merit pay
system is an alternative education facility that has an enrollment of approximately 500 students
pursuing a high school diploma.  The school also has an adult basic education enrollment of about
100 students pursuing GED preparation, a high school degree, or English as Second Language
programs.  There are approximately two dozen faculty members at the high school.
This school implemented its merit pay system at a time of great transition in adult
education and K-12 educational funding in Michigan.  In 1995, the state legislature had taken two
actions that influenced adult and alternative education institutions in the state.  First, in the state
budget, the legislature virtually “zeroed out” all state funds for adult education and transferred
those funds into the state economic development agency to be used for customized training. 
Second, the state passed a comprehensive public education finance reform that moved the state
from a system funded primarily at the local level by property taxes to a system which is state-
funded, primarily through sales taxes.  The new state finance system funds “pupils” (students
under age 21 in elementary or secondary schooling and pursuing a program leading to a high
school diploma) at a foundation allowance that is nearly identical for all districts.  Given that the
state funds alternative education pupils at approximately $6,000 per year (expressed in 2000
9The initial enrollment in the class for purposes of calculating retention is capped at 20, so to earn the
retention bonus, teachers must have 16 students or 80 percent of the initial enrollment at the end of the term, whichever
is less.  Sometimes actual class sizes exceed 20, and in these cases, the retention bonus is still earned if the ending
enrollment is 16 or more.  This was seen as an incentive for teachers to allow larger enrollments in their classes, when
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dollars), this high school decided to disengage from the adult education consortium it participated
in prior to 1995 and to focus primarily on alternative education for high school students.  In the
same year that the legislature revised the school finance system, it also passed a law that allows
school districts to operate pilot programs that may be exempt from collective bargaining
requirements.
The district decided to operate the high school as a “pilot” program with a performance-
based compensation scheme for its teachers, who collectively decided to remain separate from the
local district’s education association (union).  Alternative education settings are characterized by
students who have often not succeeded in traditional school settings, and who usually experience
attendance problems and intermittent drop-out and re-enrollment episodes.  Consequently, the
performance-based incentives are targeted on student retention.
Description of the performance-based compensation system  
Teachers are paid a base wage for each 60-minute class that they teach.  The base wage
depends solely on their own educational attainment (not on experience or tenure).  Teachers with
a Master’s degree or higher receive a 5 percent higher base pay than teachers with a Bachelor’s
degree.  The merit-pay system offers two supplements that may be earned and added to the base
pay.  A retention bonus is paid if 80 percent or more of the students assigned to the class (as of
the end of the second week of the quarter) are still enrolled and attending at the end of the
quarter.9  The bonus is the same for all teachers, no matter what their educational background,
it was warranted by scheduling and overall enrollment concerns.
10This was the average rating in the previous school year.
11Hatry et al. (1994) found a range of merit pay awards in their study from at most 25 percent of salary to five
percent or less.  See also Lawler (1983).
12The high school is on an eight-period per day schedule, and the average teaching load is seven classes.
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and it is approximately 12.5 percent of the base for teachers with Bachelor’s degrees (12 percent
for Masters plus).
The second supplement is based on student evaluations.  Students rate the following 15
factors on a 1 - 5 scale:
C Objectives, requirements, and expectations for the class were clearly started
C The instructor was well-informed and had current knowledge of subject matter
C The instructor was well-prepared for each class
C The instructor presented the material clearly
C The material was presented in an organized manner
C The instructor used class time well
C The instructor was interested in students and was willing to listen to them
C The instructor encouraged student participation and welcomed questions,
discussion, and different points of view
C The instructor encouraged a high level of student attendance in the class
C The methods of evaluating student progress and performance were clearly stated
C The instructor encouraged students to think critically
C The instructor was enthusiastic
C The instructor was aware of the varying levels and abilities of students
C the materials used were appropriate for the subject taught
C This class was worthwhile.
Teachers who receive an average rating of 4.65 or higher10 on t e 5-point scale for all 15 items in
all of their classes (weighted by class enrollment) in each quarter for four (4) consecutive quarters
receive the performance bonus, which increases their base pay by about 5 percent and increases
their retention bonus by 10 percent.11  To give the reader a sense for the size of these bonuses,
during school year 1998-99, the base pay for a teacher with a Bachelor’s degree was $816 per
class ($22,848 for nine months; four quarters with seven classes).12  With the performance bonus
13Many teachers have more than six classes per term.  With at least six, the teachers receive full benefits
equivalent to the unionized teachers in the district.
14Results from analyses using data that are one year prior to implementation of the merit system and one year
after implementation are similar in magnitude, sign, and statistical significance.
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and retention bonuses in all classes, the per class pay would be $979 ($27,412 for nine months;
four quarters with seven classes).13
Impacts on student outcomes  
Did the performance incentives affect student outcomes at this school?  To answer this
question, we analyzed data from students at this school and at a similar alternative education high
school in the same county that relies on a traditional experience/education compensation scheme. 
Both schools have open enrollment within the county, so they draw from the same population of
students.  In particular, we have obtained data for a five-year period (1994/1995 - 1998/1999)
that encompasses two years prior to and two years after the implementation of the performance
incentive system.  We perform a difference-in-differences analysis of several student outcomes
including grade point average, class attendance, course completion, and passing rates conditional
on course completion.  The grade point average (GPA) is calculated from student-level data; the
other three outcomes—attendance, completion, and conditional passing—are calculated from
course-level data.  The data are for alternative education high school students only; they do not
include adult education students.
Table 1 shows the analysis of GPA data.  The pre- and postimplementation data are for
the 1994/1995 and 1998/1999 school years, respectively, which are two years prior to and two
years after implementation of the merit pay system in School 1.14 The (student) average GPA in
both schools declined over the five-year period, but the decline in School 1 of 0.53 points was
15Standard errors are calculated under the assumption that there is no covariance between the two districts.
This assumption places an upper bound on the standard errors, since any positive covariance (which would be expected)
would lower the standard errors.  
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greater in magnitude than the decline of 0.37 points in School 2.15   Interviews with administrators
in both schools confirmed that the change in the funding mechanism as well as secular trends have
caused an increase in “harder-to-serve” students at both alternative high schools, so they were
well aware of the declines in GPA.  The fact that the decline in School 1 was greater than the
decline in School 2 is consistent with the hypothesis that the merit pay incentive resulted in higher
retention of lower-achieving students, who were most likely to drop out.
Table 1
Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Grade Point Average
School 1
(Merit pay)
School 2
(Traditional pay)
Difference 
(Sch.1 
Diff.-in-Diff. 
(Post 
Sch. 1 
Pre (1994/95)
Std. error
No. of obs.
2.71
(0.04)
            392
2.19
(0.08)
               324
0.52
(0.09)
Post (1998/99)
Std. error
No. of obs.
2.18
(0.04)
            578
1.82
(0.05)
              304
0.36
(0.07)
Difference (Post - Pre)
Std. error
-0.53
(0.06)
-0.37
(0.09)
-0.16
(0.11)
What about the drop-out rate itself, which was the outcome targeted by the merit-pay
system?  Table 2 presents the analysis of this outcome.  The entries in table 2 are the percentage
of students who did not complete a class after enrolling in it and attending it for at least one day. 
The percentages do include students who may have attended a class for a short period of time and
then transferred to another class.  There was no way to trace transfers in the student data base
system.  However, interviews with administrators suggest that such a phenomenon was quite
small at both high schools.
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Table 2
Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Course Noncompletion Percentages 
School 1
(Merit Pay)
School 2
(Traditional pay)
Difference 
(Sch.1 
Diff.-in-Diff. 
(Post 
 Sch. 1 
Pre (1994/95)
Std. error
No. of obs.
49.08
(0.67)
         5,316
60.98
(1.09)
         2,004
-11.90
(1.29)
Post (1998/99)
Std. error
No. of obs.
28.34
(0.58)
         6,171
45.53
(0.76)
         4,318
-17.19
(0.95)
Difference (Post 
Std. error
-20.74
(0.89)
-12.74
(1.33)
-5.29
(1.60)
While the noncompletion percentages decreased in both schools over the five-year period,
the decrease was quite dramatic in School 1, as would be predicted.  Prior to the merit pay
system, in which compensation is partially based on the number of students who complete
courses, about half the students in School 1 completed their courses (note the courses in both
schools are on the quarter system).  After the implementation of the merit pay system, the fraction
increased by almost 50 percent to three-quarters.  
An interesting aspect of the merit pay system is that it rewarded teachers for the number
of students still enrolled at the end of the course.  Attendance was not rewarded (except that a
student had to be present during the last week of classes to be considered a completer).  Table 3
presents our analysis of the daily attendance of students.  The entries in the table are the
percentage of students attending class averaged over each class and each reporting period.  Again,
interviews with administrators confirmed that the very low rates of attendance are correct.  The
merit pay system appears to have little effect (and, in fact, the sign is negative) on daily
attendance.  School 1’s attendance rate stayed approximately the same in the two years, and
School 2’s rate actually went up slightly, which is the opposite of what one would expect if
teachers were to respond to economic incentives by finding ways to increase overall attendance
and not simply during the week the actual class count was taken.
14
Table 3
Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Course Daily Attendance 
School 1
(Merit pay)
School 2
(Traditional pay)
Difference
(Sch.1 
Diff.-in-Diff. 
(Post 
Sch. 1 
Pre (1994/95)
Std. error
N
59.02
(0.41)
          5,316
34.24 
(0.69)
          2,004
24.78
(0.86)
Post (1998/99)
Std. error
N
58.62 
(0.35)
           6,171
36.33 
(0.47)
           4,318
22.29 
(0.58)
Difference(Post 
Std. error
-0.40
(0.54)
2.09
(0.83)
-2.49 
(1.04)
Finally, we looked at the percentage of students who passed the course given that they
completed the course (i.e., did not receive a failing or incomplete grade).  Table 4 displays our
analysis of these data.  Consistent with the GPA data, the percentage of students actually passing
their courses declined over the period of analysis.  Again, the decline was far larger for School 1,
which went from approximately 93 percent to 75 percent.  That school’s decline in the percentage
of students passing the course conditional on completion is over 6 percentage points greater than
School 2’s.  Again, this is consistent with the hypothesis that School 1 is retaining, on average,
more low-achieving students.
Discussion of the results
The merit pay system, established in School 1, was intended to increase student retention. 
In discussion with the school’s administrators, we determined that a further goal was to increase
student achievement.  Their reasoning was that increased achievement would result from
increased retention.  
The outcomes of this merit pay system illustrate the difficulty of instituting such a
compensation system in schools.  First, the output measure has to be easily, inexpensively, and
accurately determined and it has to be agreed upon up front.  In this case, the administrators of
the high school knew that they wanted to increase retention. Thus, a student was considered to be
retained in a class if the student was present during a randomly selected day of the last week of
16In some states, aid is based on average daily attendance (ADA); in Michigan, where this case study is
located, the aid is based on enrollment on a particular “count day” in fall and in winter.
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Table 4
Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Course Passing Percentages for Students 
Who Completed the Course
School 1
(Merit pay)
School 2
(Traditional pay)
Difference 
(Sch.1
Diff.-in-Diff. 
(Post 
 Sch. 1 
Pre (1994/95)
Std. error
N
93.35 
(0.48)
        2,707
76.47 
(1.52)
          782
16.88 
(1.59)
Post (1998/99)
Std. error
N
75.67 
(0.65)
        4,422
65.21 
(0.96)
        2,489
10.46 
(1.50)
Difference(Post 
Std. error
-17.68 
(0.80)
-11.26 
(1.79)
-6.42 
(1.96)
classes when the principal would make an unannounced visit to the class and count how many
students were present.  If the count was greater than or equal to the minimum standard (80
percent of the starting enrollment of 16), then the teacher was awarded the bonus.  The incentive
“worked” by this measure of output as demonstrated in table 2, which showed a dramatic
reduction in the percentage of course noncompleters.
However, the second difficulty is that the output measure has to be the organization’s final
product that will be sold, or at least highly correlated with the final product.  In this case, the
definition of final product is ambiguous.  If we assume that the school is in business to maximize
revenue, then it should be concerned about student attendance during the period when the state
measures enrollment upon which its aid is based.16  Table 3 shows that the merit pay system
perhaps had a deleterious effect on student daily attendance.
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If we assume that the school is in business to maximize student learning, then it may be the
case that the merit pay system that was implemented had the appropriate incentives. 
Unfortunately, neither school conducted any sort of standardized testing of the entire student
body, so there was no “testing” measure of learning achieved.  In table 1, we examined student
grade point averages as a proxy for student achievement, and in table 4, we examined passing
rates as another proxy.  In both cases, the measure declined more in the school with merit pay. 
However, because of a compositional change, this does not necessarily imply that academic
achievement declined for each student relatively more in that school.  This effect can be illustrated
by positing three kinds of students—high-achieving students, denoted by H; low- achieving
students who complete courses, denoted by LC; and low-achieving students who drop out of
courses, denoted by LD.  The student achievement measures that we use are based only on H and
LC students.  If the merit pay system caused LD students to become LC students, then overall
grade point averages and passing rates will drop, but student learning may increase if the
academic outcomes of LC students exceed the academic outcomes of LD students.  The data are
consistent with this sort of outcome in School 1, so that the reductions in GPA and passing rates
may not be all that bad. 
On the other hand, the reductions in GPA and passing rates may be reasons for great
alarm. Administrators in School 1 provided anecdotes that suggested that teachers were altering
their instructional style and course content in order to make their courses more interesting to and
well liked by students.  Presumably the teachers were trying to entice students who would
otherwise have dropped out to stay in the course to ensure that they would earn their student
retention bonus, and they were trying to get better student evaluations, which is the second
17Hoxby (1996) reported similar results when one considers those student likely to drop out as low academic
achievers.  Milkman (1989) followed a similar approach for twelfth-grade high school students.  Argysand Rees
(1995) also found small but significantly positive union effects on student achievement.  
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component of the merit pay plan.  Anecdotes included activities such as more field trips and in-
class parties.  If the instructional and content changes made by instructors as a result of the
implementation of the merit pay system resulted in less rigorous curriculum, then the GPA results
will underestimate the true decline in student learning.  Furthermore, if there is a significant peer
effect in learning, it may be the case that the presence of students who otherwise would not have
completed the course reduced the learning of other students.  Finally, if the students who
otherwise would not have completed the course exert less effort and do not learn as much, then
student achievement would not be increased by their retention.
Since the change in collective bargaining status in School 1 is coincident with the adoption
of the merit pay system, it is possible that our results may reflect not only the effect of the merit-
pay system but also the effect of collective bargaining on student achievement and other
outcomes.  However, closer inspection suggests that collective bargaining may not be a large
mitigating factor, since our results are not consistent with the effects one would expect from
collective bargaining.  For instance, Eberts and Stone (1984) found that low-achieving students
have lower student test score gains in districts covered by collective bargaining than do low-
achieving students in districts not covered.17  While the measure of student outcomes may not be
exactly comparable between our study and Eberts and Stone’s, it is instructive to make the
comparison.  If collective bargaining did have an effect on our results, we would expect student
GPA to decline more in School 2, the traditional pay system with collective bargaining, than in
School 1, because School 1 is no longer covered by collective bargaining in the post period but
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School 2 still is covered.  Similarly, we would expect the difference in GPA between the two
districts to be larger in the post period after merit pay is implemented and collective bargaining
eliminated in School 1 as compared to the period before merit pay when both schools are covered
by collective bargaining.  However, neither of these expectations is supported by the results,
suggesting that collective bargaining may not play a major role in explaining our results. 
Furthermore, the effects of collective bargaining should move in the same direction as the effects
of merit pay and both should yield a positive difference-in-differences result.  Yet, even with the
supposedly  reinforcing effects of the two factors, the difference-in-differences result is not
positive and statistically significant.   
IV.  Conclusion
In summary, this case study of the implementation of a merit-pay system in a specific high
school suggests that incentives do “work.”  The merit-pay system is directly targeted at student
retention, as defined by a measure understood and agreed upon by both teachers and
administrators.  The evidence is consistent with the implementation of the merit pay system
resulting in higher student retention, as defined by attendance during the last week of classes.  The
administrators who implemented the system had also anticipated that other desired outcomes
would follow.  However, the case study suggests that these outcomes were not achieved and, in
fact, unintended consequences may have arisen as a direct result of the success of the merit-pay
system.   Student grade-point averages and daily attendance rates were virtually unchanged, and
course passing rates declined.  There was also anecdotal evidence that suggested that course
content was diluted. 
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 Therefore, the results suggest that pay for performance incentives can motivate agents to
produce outcomes that are directly rewarded.  However, the study also suggests that incentive
systems within complex organizations such as schools, which have multiple tasks and outcomes,
team production, and multiple stakeholders, may produce results that are unintended and at times
misdirected. 
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